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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
sibility of a widespread, organized effort to accumulate extensive
tracts of land and thereby hold mineral interests in perpetuity with-
out user. A preservation of the land policy of the state would seem
to dictate an effort to arrest any trend towards such a movement
before it could gain momentum. I
MARJORIE C. KARSTNDIEK
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DENIAL OF EQUAL
PROTECTION-DISCRIMINATION IN
SELECTION OF JURIES
In the recent case of State v. Perkins,' a negro was convicted
of aggravated rape of a white woman. On appeal he contended
that members of the negro race had been arbitrarily and systemati-
cally excluded from jury service solely because of race and color.'
The general venire list, containing the names of five negroes, had
been selected from the rolls of registered voters which contained the
names of approximately thirty-four thousand white persons, and
five hundred forty negroes.' One negro had served on the grand
jury, and one had been included on the petit jury panel. It was
held that appellant had been granted an opportunity to have mem-
bers of his race serve upon the grand and petit juries, and had thus
been afforded his full constitutional rights.'
Since the emancipation of the negro, the question of exclusion
of negroes from juries has been considered numerous times by the
United States Supreme Court.5 Prior to the decision of Pierre v.
1. 211 La. 993, 31 So. (2d) 188 (1947).
2. Exclusion from grand or petit jury service because of race or color is
forbidden by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, by an Act of Congress of March 1, 1875 (18 Stat.
336-387, 8 U. S.. C. A. § 44 [1940]), by Article I, Section 2, of the Louisiana
Constitution of 1921, and by Article 172 *of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1928.
3. in the 1940 census the population of the parish was 54,744 or 62% white
and 33,634 or 38% colored. The 1940 literacy figures were not available, but
the 1930 census showed the colored population to be 43.1% of which 20.7%
were illiterate, while only 1% of the whites were illiterate.
4. Chief Justice O'Niell dissented tersely, on the ground that "... the
selecting of the general venire list entirely from the roll of registered voters
is not, in the circumstances of this case, a correct method of selection." 211 La.
993, 1007, 31 So. (2d) 188, 193 (1947).
5. For example: Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370, 26 L. Ed. 567 (1880);
Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U. S. 592, 16 S. Ct. 900, 40 L. Ed. 1082 (1896); Carter
v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442, 20 S. Ct. 687, 44 L. Ed. 839 (1900); Thomas v. Texas,
212 U. S. 278, 29 S. Ct. 393, 53 L. Ed. 512 (1909); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S.
587, 55 S. Ct. 579, 79 L. Ed. 1074 (1935); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354,
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Louisiana' the Louisiana Supreme Court took the view that if
negroes were not represented on juries, it was not because of dis-
crimination, but because the jury commissioners themselves being
white, would, in the selection of venirenlen, naturally tend to select
white men whom they knew to be good and true in preference to
black men whom they did not know.7 In the Pierre case the United
States Supreme Court held that systematic exclusion of negroes
from juries constituted a denial of equal protection of the laws.
Louisiana courts have made a conscientious effort to secure com-
pliance with the requirements of that decision.8 In State v. Ander-
son9 a murder conviction of a negro defendant was reversed by the
Louisiana Supreme Court because the evidence established a prima
facie case of systematic discrimination over a period of thirty-one
years, during which time no negro ever served on a jury, and only
one negro's name was placed on the general venire."° The second
trial was held under more favorable circumstances. Fifteen per cent
of the general venire list was colored;" three negroes were on the
grand jury panel of twenty, and one served; twenty negroes were
on the petit jury panel of fifty, and six were drawn although none
served. As a result of these precautions the conviction was upheld. 2
Although the assertion is repeatedly made that percentages and
proportions are not in themselves proof of discrimination, there are
a number of cases in which virtually nothing else but percentage
discrepancies were shown." In general these are cases in which the
number of negroes serving was extremely small in proportion to
59 S. Ct. 536, 83 L. Ed. 757 (1939); Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 61 S. Ct.
164, 85 L. Ed. 84 (1940); Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 62 S. Ct. 1159, 86 L. Ed.
1559 (1942) ; Akins v. Texas, 325 U. S. 398, 65 S. Ct. 1276, 89 L. Ed. 1692 (1945);
Patton v. Mississippi, 92 L. Ed. 164 (U. S. 1947).
6. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 59 S. Ct. 536, 83 L. Ed. 757 (1939),
noted in (1939) 1 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW 841.
7. State v. Turner, 133 La. 555, 63 So. 169 (1913).
8. See discussion of testimony to this-effect in State v. Perkins, 211 La.
993, 31 So. (2d) 188 (1947). ffl
9. 205 La. 710, 18 So. (2d) 33 (1944), discussed in (1946) 6 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 660.
10. The court relied on Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400, 62 S. Ct. 1159, 86
L. Ed. 1559 (1942). In that case the Court found a prima facie case of dis-
crimination because for sixteen years no negro had been called for grand jury
service, although some few had been called for petit jury service. The population
figures were 16,605 negroes out of a total of 398,564, and literacy among negroes
ran as high as 921/%.
11. 1940 census showed 12,986 white, 4,421 negro.
12. 206 La. 986, 20 So. (2d) 288 (1944), cert. denied 324 U. S. 868, 65 S. Ct.
913, 89 L. Ed. 1423 (1945), discussed in (1946) 6 LOuISIANA LAW REVIEW 660.




the number available, 4 and in which this. unbalanced status had
been shown to have existed for a number of years.' 5 As either of
these factors (proportion and time) is diminished so as to bring
the number of negroes seiving nearer to a fair proportion or to
shorten the period of time, the value of numbers and percentages
as proof decreases until an unknown point is reached where they
become merely convenient manifestations of discrimination which
must be otherwise proved.
The importance of the time factor is brought more sharply into
focus when we consider that in no case has the United States Su-
preme Court reversed a conviction where the charge of discrimina-
tion was directed solely at the particular venire involved. Where
convictions have been reversed, exclusion of negroes had been shown
over periods of years ranging upward from eight years.'" It is not
suggested that it may not be possible to show discrimination on
only a single venire, but rather that attempts to do so have been
singularly unsuccessful. These considerations may throw some light
on what is meant by "systematic exclusion."
As to the other variable factor (proportionate percentages) it
is at once apparent that in order to be termed a "prima facie case
of discrimination" there must have been virtually total exclusion of
negroes.' 7 This must be qualified to the extent that not every total
exclusion amounts to discrimination."8 It is possible to have no
negro representation at all without there being discrimination, be-
cause one is not entitled of right to have members of his race serve
as jurors.'9 Between the extremes of total exclusion amounting to
discrimination and mathematically proportionate representation
there are infinite variations, about which the most that can be said
is that each case must be decided on its own facts. The problem
simmers down to one of proof. Thus a greater disproportion in
14. Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 61 S. Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84 (1940).
15. Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U. S. 613, 58 S. Ct. 753, 82 L. Ed. 1050 (1938).
16. Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 61 S. Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84 (1940).
17. Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 55 S. Ct. 579, 79 L. Ed. 1074 (1935).
18. Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 26 S. Ct. 338, 50 L. Ed. 497 (1906);
Thomas v. Texas, 212 U. S. 278, 29 S. Ct. 393, 53 L. Ed. 512 (1909).
19. Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316, 26 S. Ct. 338, 50 L. Ed. 497 (1906).
Historically interesting is the case of Respublica v. Mesca, 1 U. S. 73, 1 Dall.
73, 1 L. Ed. 42 (1783) in which the Court reluctantly granted to four Italians a
jury do medietate linguae on the precedent of one unreported case and an English
statute of the year 1353. Such a jury may'no longer be granted since the Act
of Congress of 14th April 1884, § 149.
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one case may be more readily explained by the state than a lesser
disproportion in another case.2"
A few valid reasons why negroes have not served on petit juries
which have been used successfully to explain their absence are their
economic status,2' disbelief in capital punishment,2 illness or physi-
incapacity,2" and the exercise by the state of its powerful weapon
of peremptory challenges.24 Further possible reasons are illiteracy
and mere failure to appear due to distrust of the white man's legal
machinery. All these things may be used to explain what appears
to be disproportionate absence of negroes.
Also operating to keep negroes off venire lists as well as petit
juries is the well-known fact that very few of them are registered
voters. In Patton v. Mississippi,5 a state statute made qualification
as a voter one of the prerequisites of jury service. The validity of
that provision was not discussed by the writer of the opinion, but
it was assumed to be a reasonable requirement. In the Perkins
case,2" the action of the jury commissioners in confining their selec-
tion to the list of registered voters was attacked and upheld." The
first impression of such a statutory requirement, in view of the fact
that negroes are conspicuously absent from lists of registered voters,
is that here is indeed an ingenious method of excluding negroes
from jury service; and for a greater reason, the action of jury com-
missioners in so limiting their selection without the sanction of such
a statute appears to be discriminatory. It is suggested, however,
that such a practice is objectionable only where an attempt is made
20. Compare Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S. 128, 61 S. Ct. 164, 85 L. Ed. 84,
(1940) (During eight years the names of eighteen negroes were placed on the
lists. Thirteen appeared as last 'on the list, while the others were toward the
end of the list and unlikely to be used. Held discriminatory.) with State v.
Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. (2d) 273 (1945) discussed in (1946) 6 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 660 (Only one negro was on the grand jury panel of 75 while the
population figures were 344,775 whites to 149,034 negroes. It was pointed out
that many negroes had asked to be excused, because, being day laborers, they
could not afford to miss work. Held not discriminatory.).
21. State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. (2d) 273 (1945), discussed in (1946)
6 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 660.
22. State v. Anderson, 206 La. 986, 20 So. (2d) 288 (1944), cert. denied
324 U. S. 868, 65 S. Ct. 913, 89 L. Ed. 1423 (1945), discussed in (1946) 6
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 660.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. 92 L. Ed. 164 (U. S. 1947).
26. 211 La. 993, 31 So. (2d) 188 (1947).
27. In Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U. S. 213, 18 S. Ct. 583, 42 L. Ed. 1012
(1898) the Court discussed a state law which required persons to be registered
voters in order to serve as jurors. Held such laws are not discriminatory,
and ". . . it has not been shown that their actual administration was evil, only
that evil was possible under them."
1948]
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to limit the number of negroes on venires proportionately to the
number of registered negro voters, and that it is not only unobjec-
tionable but is praiseworthy where the device is used to improve
the quality of the veniremen.
The decision in the Perkins case is illustrative of the above prin-
ciples. While the selection of veniremen was confined to the list
of registered voters, appellant did not show that this list was used
to limit the number of negroes serving. Also appellant failed to
show systematic exclusion, whereas the state showed that negroes
had served recently.
Does the rule against discrimination apply to negroes alone?
The Fourteenth Amendment and the ancillary statute of March 1,
1875,2" were admittedly adopted solely for the protection of negroes,
but their provisions are broad enough to include any race or color.
Under those provisions, courts have considered and rejected claims
of discriminatory exclusion of Japanese2" and of Indians.3 Claims
of discrimination because of nationality (as distinguished from race
or color) have been made by Italians,"' Mexicans,". and Creoles;-"
also group discrimination has been urged by Catholics, 4 Socialists,"
and wage earners." In only one of these cases, however, was the
charge of discrimination upheld. 7 The recent case of Fay v. New
York"8 considered the charges of two labor union officials that in
28. 18 Stat. 336-337 (1875), 8 U. S. C. A. § 44 (1940).
29. In re Shibuya Jugiro, 140 U. S. 291, 11 S. Ct. 770, 35 L. Ed. 510 (1891)
(habeas corpus not the proper method of presentation before the Supreme Court) ;
Honda v. People, 111 Colo. 279, 141 P. (2d) 178 (1943) (issue not raised timely).
In both cases, although the basis for the holding was as indicated, the courts
indicated that the charges of discrimination were without merit.
30. Morris v. State, 62 Okla. Cr. 337, 71 P. (2d) 514 (1937) (full-blood);
State v. Walters, 61 Idaho 341, 102 P. (2d) 284 (1940) (quarter-breed). Discrimin-
ation not proved in either case.
31. State v. Guirlando, 152 La. 570, 93 So. 796 (1922).
32. Miera v. Territory, 81 Pac. 586 (N. M. 1905); Sanchez v. State, 147
Tex. Cr. Rep. 436, 181 S. W. (2d) 87 (1944); Salazar v. State, 193 S. W. (2d)
211 ('rex. Ct. Cr. App. 1946).
33. State v. Laborde, 120 La. 136, 45 So. 38 (1907). Also State v. Manuel,
133 La. 571, 63 So. 174 (1913) (exclusion of those who speak French).
34.. Juarez v. State, 102 Tex. Cr. Rep. 297, 277 S. W. 1091 (1925) (remanded
for further hearing on the issue).
35. Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U. S. 480, 38 S. Ct. 168, 62 L. Ed. 414,
(1917).
36. Mamaux v. United States, 264 Fed. 816 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920) (wage
earners); Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 66 S. Ct. 984, 90 L. Ed.
1181 (1946) (daily wage earners) State v. Krieger, 33 So. (2d) 58 (La. 1947)
(white manual laborers). Cf. Rawlins v. Georgia, 201 U. S. 638, 26 S. Ct. 560,
50 L. Ed. 899 (1906) (lawyers, ministers, doctors, dentists, and railway engineers
and firemen).
37. Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co., 328 U. S. 217, 66 S. Ct. 984, 90 L. Ed.
1181 (1946).
38. 67 S. Ct. 1613, 91 L. Ed. 1517 (U. S. 1947).
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the selection of the jury there had been discrimination against
laborers and women. The latter charge was summarily dismissed
because women were not required by law to serve, 9 discrimination
against them was not proved, and also defendants were not mem-
bers of the excluded class.4" The Court found that the charge of
discrimination against laborers had not been proved. Although the
Court has expressly left the door open for the consideration of
charges of discrimination which fall outside the race or color cate-
gory,41 it has indicated that it will be extremely reluctant to grant
relief in cases other than those covered by the 1875 Act of Con-
gress.42
SANDERS R. CAZEDESSUS
PRIVATE RIGHTS OF WAY
Private rights of way may be obtained by imposition of law'
or by voluntary contract,2 depending upon the purpose for which
the right of way is sought. The right obtained may consist of (1)
full ownership of the land underlying the right of way (2) a predial
servitude of passage (3) a right of way which does not conform to
the legal requirements of either full ownership or a predial servi-
tude.
The owner of an estate which is completely surrounded by
other lands has the right to claim a legal servitude of passage across a
neighbor's land to the nearest public road,' for everything necessary
39. Nor are they required to serve in Louisiana, La. Const. of 1921, Art.
VI1, § 41. For a discussion of the problem as regards women jurors, see Fenberg,
Matilda, Jury Service for Women (1947) 33 Women Lawyers Journal 45.
40. Cf. State v. Dierlamm, 189 La. 544, 180 So. 135 (1938) (relief denied
to white man who objected that all negroes were excluded); and Haraway v.
State, 203 Ark. 912, 159 S. W. (2d) 733 (1942) (relief denied to negro who
objected that all white persons were excluded).
41. 67 S. Ct. 1613, 1625 (U. S. 1947).
42. The purpose of the statute as a whole is stated as follows: "Whereas,
it is essential to just government we recognize the equality of all men before
the law, and hold that it is the duty of government in its dealings with the
people to mete out equal and exact justice to all, of whatever nativity, race,
color, or persuasion, religious or political; and it being the appropriate object
of legislation to enact great fundamental principles into law: Therefore, Be
it enacted . . . . Section. 4 of the statute, dealing with exclusion of jurors, is
confined in terms to prohibiting disqualification 'on account or race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.'"
1. Art. 699 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. Art. 709 et seq., La. Civil Code of 1870.
3. Art. 699, 702, La. Civil Code of 1870. La. Act 54 of 1896 [Dart's Stats.
(1939) § 3736]. Article 699 states that the owner of enclosed lands may claim
a right of passage to the nearest public road, railroad, tramroad, or water course.
1948]
